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BOMB-MAKING MANUALS ON THE INTERNET:
MANEUVERING A SOLUTION THROUGH
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
BRYAN J. YEAZEL*
I. BACKGROUND OF REGULATION ON THE INTERNET
As early as 1995, the United States Congress moved to imple-
ment legislation regulating the dissemination of explosives infor-
mation on the Internet. In June of 1995, Senator Feinstein (D-
CA) proposed legislation "to address the problem of increasingly
widespread 'distribution of bomb-making information for crimi-
nal purposes."' 1 The proposed legislation would have made it
unlawful to disseminate or instruct others in the means of con-
structing incendiary devices.'
Senator Feinstein's legislation portended to be one of the
government's first attempts at regulating conduct in "cyber-
space."3 However, the amendment slipped into legislative obliv-
* Editor, NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y, 2001-2002. Thomas J.
White Scholar 2000-2002.J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2002. B.A.,
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1. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT ON THE AvAILABILITY OF BOMBMAKING
INFORMATION 5 (1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cyber
crime/bombmakinginfo.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2001); see also Appendix A
for text of Feinstein amendment.
2. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 1. The amendment specifically provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person to teach or demonstrate the making
of explosive materials, or to distribute by any means information per-
taining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture of explosive materials,
if the person intends or knows, that such explosive materials or infor-
mation will likely be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that
constitutes a Federal criminal offense or a criminal offense of a crimi-
nal purpose affecting interstate commerce.
Id. at BACKGROUND.
3. The author William Gibson is credited with coining the term "cyber-
space" in his science fiction novel NEUROMANCER. Gibson conceptualized cyber-
space as a "shared hallucination" that served as a "medium through which
people could interact and where computer constructs provided sensory rich-
ness and intellectual challenge." See VRML WORKS, Cyberspace, available at http:/
/home.hiwaay.net/-crispen/vrmlworks/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2001) (quoting
William Gibson) (Web page on file with the NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
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ion. The Senate approved the legislation on two separate
occasions by unanimous vote. In both instances, the amendment
suffocated in conference committee.4
At nearly the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court heard
arguments in Reno v. ACLU, and eventually struck down the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), one of the government's
first attempts at regulating content on the Internet. After the
Court squarely rejected regulation of indecent speech on the
Internet, Congress backed away from attempts to regulate the
Internet.6 In lieu of Senator Feinstein's legislation, the Senate
requested that the Department of Justice (DOJ) conduct a study
on the extent to which bomb-making information was electroni-
cally available and the scope of First Amendment protection for
such information.7
The DOJ report suggested alterations to the proposed Fein-
stein amendment8 in 1997.' In counseling a cautious approach
to any legislation, the DOJ relied heavily on the district court's
decision in Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc."° The Rice decision held
that the First Amendment precluded a finding that the publisher
of an "how to" manual for assassinations was civilly liable for a
death in which the victim's killer allegedly relied on the manual.
At the time, Rice was the only decision on-point. However, the
DOJ's assessment was premature as the Fourth Circuit Court of
POL'Y) The term "cyberspace" has come to mean a litany of things in contem-
porary society. Whereas commercial interests may be more interested in the
effect of cyberspace on commerce, other visions of cyberspace were often more
romantic and mystical in detailing how it could affect communication. One
author noted:
But what is cyberspace? Where had it come from? Cyberspace had
oozed out of the world's computers like stage-magic fog. Cyberspace
was an alternate reality, it was the huge interconnected computation
that was being collectively run by planet Earth's computers around the
clock. Cyberspace was the information Net, but more than the Net,
cyberspace was a shared vision of the Net as a physical space.
Id. (quoting Rudy Rucker in THE HACKER AND THE ANTS).
4. Id. at 5.
5. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
6. See generally Mark S. Kende, Lost in Cyberspace: TheJudiciary's Distracted
Application of Free Speech and PersonalJurisdiction Doctrines to the Internet, 77 OR. L.
REv. 1125 (1998).
7. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 3, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime.bombmakinginfo.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2001) (citing
§ 709 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1297 (1996)).
8. See Appendix B for the DOJ's proposed alterations to the Feinstein
amendment.
9. Id. at 30.
10. 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996).
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Appeals later reversed the Rice decision, holding that a publisher
of a "how to" guide on assassination received no protection
under the First Amendment from aiding and abetting laws."
The proliferation of technology in the past five years has opened
the door to some of the greatest gains in corporate efficiency and
communication ever. However, it has also ushered in an era
where wide-spread dissemination of lethal information requires
only a few clicks. Because the law regulating conduct on the
Internet has developed substantially on this issue since 1997, the
legal climate is primed to reconsider legislation curtailing the
dissemination of explosives information on the Internet.
A. Availability of Bomb-Making Information on the Internet
5 g Mercury glass stirring rod blue litmus paper
35 ml nitric acid distilled water small funnel
100 ml beaker(2) paper acid resistant glove
90 ml ethyl alcohol heat source'
2
The availability of bomb-making information on the
Internet should be a palpable concern for any lawmaker. Con-
tent that provides an "ingredient list" and instructions on how to
make incendiary devices is presumptively more dangerous than
other forms of violent content on the Internet. There is a sub-
stantial debate (at least in some circles) about the connection
between exposure to violent content and the use of violent force.
The debate largely short-circuits reasoned attempts to make con-
structive policy changes in the area of violence. Because it is dif-
ficult to demonstrate the causal connection between one
observing violent content and one behaving violently at some
later date, reasonable people differ on whether a solution is
needed at all. With bomb-making instructions, this otherwise
sharp debate is dramatically dulled.
11. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. den'd, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998).
12. THE Bic BOOK OF MISCHIEF 12 (2000), available at http://www.ripco.
com/download/text/e-texts/tbbom/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2000) (on file with
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y). The information is an ingredient list
for constructing a mercury fulminate bomb and is readily available on the
Internet with three or four clicks of a mouse and five minutes of time. The
recipe is one of many the author provides and follows an introduction where he
solicits additional information from the reader. The author notes that "[a]
couple of case studies are still needed-please make suggestions! World Trade
Center Bombing[,] The Unabornb Case[,] Major Professional pyrotechnical
mishaps." Id. at 1. Although this information is readily available to anyone with
an Internet connection, I have taken the liberty to change one of the ingredi-
ents. I do not mean to misquote the author but rather feel the reader is best
left not knowing how to construct a mercury fulminate bomb.
2002]
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Reasonable people more easily accept the "but for" causa-
tion between an adolescent child reading a blueprint for con-
structing a bomb and the child constructing a bomb. Without
access to design information, children are usually beyond their
educational league and cannot construct explosive devices. If
not legally, people understand intellectually that information
about bomb construction is generally not available on the aver-
age family's bookshelf.
Information about constructing bombs is currently available
in print.1" However, dissemination of bomb-making information
in print comes with built-in barriers to access. Purchasing a
bomb-making instruction manual requires many steps. First,
those who search for information must locate a bookstore or
publishing house willing to sell the information. Second, they
must provide some form of payment for the materials. Third,
they must be willing to bear the social consequences (whatever
they may be) of purchasing a title that others frown upon. More
importantly, each individual purchaser must incur all of these
costs. The Internet substantially diminishes those barriers to
information access. Notwithstanding intellectual property
restrictions, dissemination of bomb-making information on the
Internet requires only one purchaser to bear these costs and to
incur the minimal cost of space on the Internet. Therefore, the
publication of bomb-making instructions is not unique to the
Internet, but the potential scope of dissemination and available
audiences is markedly greater on the Internet.
Recent acts of terror in the United States have heightened
the concern over dissemination of bomb-making instructions on
the Internet. 4 It seems a foregone conclusion that probabilities
favor the chance someone will use this information in the com-
mission of a violent act. Even while cautioning against heavy
Internet regulation, Professor Cass Sunstein noted that "[i]t is
likely, perhaps inevitable, that hateful and violent messages car-
ried over the airwaves and the Internet will someday be responsi-
13. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 1, at 5. Publishing houses have produced
titles such as THE ANARCHIST'S HANDBOOK (J. Flores, 1995), GUERILLA'S ARSE-
NAL: ADVANCED TECHNIQUES FOR MAKING EXPLOSIVES AND TIME-DELAY BOMBS
(Paladin Press, 1994), RAGNAR'S GUIDE TO HOME AND RECREATIONAL USE OF
HIGH EXPLOSIVES (Paladin Press, 1988), and IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVES: How TO
MAKE YOUR OWN (Paladin Press, 1985). Id. In considering whether mention of
these titles in their report would bolster accessibility to them, the DOJ con-
cluded that such information is "so readily available.., that [their] publication
in a Report to Congress will create no additional risk." Id. at 32.
14. See generally Lawrence Tribe, The Internet vs. the First Amendment, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1999, at A29; Caitlin Locinger, The Nation: After the Madness;
Violence, Even Before the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, at § 4-18.
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ble for acts of violence. This is simply a statement of
probability."' 5 The concern over the availability of this informa-
tion stems from experience. In countless criminal actions, peo-
ple with no formal explosives training have relied on bomb-
making manuals to perpetrate their crimes.
The DOJ reported that "law enforcement experience dem-
onstrates that persons who attempt or plan acts of terrorism
often possess literature that describes the construction of explo-
sive devices and other weapons of mass destruction." 6 The use
of bomb-making instructions in the planning of criminal offenses
has been observed in both attempts prevented by law enforce-
ment and in judicial findings of fact. For example, a schoolboy
in New York was foiled in his attempt to bomb his middle school.
Authorities noted that "the boy used a home computer to fetch a
bomb-making recipe from the Internet, then persuaded two
classmates to gather diesel fuel, fertilizer and other materials to
fashion a crude explosive device reminiscent of the one used to
destroy the Federal Building in Oklahoma City.'
17
The use of "how to" manuals for making bombs is not lim-
ited to isolated anecdotes. Federal courts observed the discovery
of bomb-making manuals during investigations of several bomb-
related crimes." Although possession of a bomb-making manual
15. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361,
366 (1996).
16. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 8.
17. Raymond Hernandez, The Outsider. Bomb Plot Suspect was Shy but Vola-
tile Loner, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at B1.
18. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 9 (citing United States v. Prevatte,
66 F.3d 840, 841 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Prevatte later read a book Williams had sug-
gested, the Anarchists Cookbook, and the two discussed, when Williams was
home from the academy on weekends, how to manufacture pipe bombs and
how to use them near gas meters as a diversionary tactic for burglaries.");
United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 507 (6th Cir. 1993) ("While doing so, the
officers observed, in plain view, ammunition, gun clips, a dynamite wick or fuse,
two pipes with end caps, books on how to make explosive devices, and a piece
of white PVC pipe with tape on the end."); United States v. Talbott, 902 F.2d
1129, 1131 (4th Cir. 1990) ("The search of his residence uncovered guns and
two pipebombs as well as extensive identity-changing material. Also seized were
various books on bomb-making and a handwritten 'hit list' containing the
names of various public officials related in some way to Talbott's prior legal
troubles."); United States v. Michael, 894 F.2d 1457, 1459 (5th Cir. 1990)
("Michael later experimented with making bombs in his garage and attended
gun shows and bought books to determine how to make bombs or silencers or
booby traps."); United States v. Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 41 (2nd Cir. 1987)
("Among the items recovered and introduced at trial were weapons, ammuni-
tion, bomb-preparation instructions and materials, copies of UFF communi-
ques, and notebooks containing coded information about the planning,
execution, and review of the bombings charged in the indictment."); United
20021
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does not alone prove that a reader intends to commit an act of
violence, both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) "expect that
because the availability of such information is becoming increas-
ingly widespread, such bomb-making instructions will continue
to play a significant role in aiding those intent upon committing
future acts of terrorism and violence." 9
Precise instructions for constructing bombs are readily avail-
able with a few short minutes of web navigation. Testifying
before the Senate Committee on Science, Commerce, and Trans-
portation, Special Agent Mark James, the ATF Deputy Chief of
Intelligence, recounted several stark realities about the ubiqui-
tous nature of bomb-making instructions on the Internet. James
observed that researchers at the ATF "ran a simple query of the
phrase 'pipe bomb'... [and] produced nearly 3 million 'hits' of
web-sites containing information on pipe bombs."20 James signif-
icantly noted the longtime recognition that availability of bomb-
making instructions on the Internet is in causal connection with
violent incidents. He observed that the use of computer "bulle-
tin boards to obtain bomb-making instructions first came to
ATF's attention in 1985, when five separate bombing incidents
were attributed to knowledge gained from the internet.
'"21
Unfortunately, those five incidents served as foreshadowing for
the next fifteen years. The frequency of actual bombing inci-
dents has increased substantially since 1995. "From 1985 to
1995, 35 bombing incidents were known to have occurred as a
result of bomb-making instructions obtained from computer bul-
letin boards" and in 1996, the number of incidents was a "600
percent increase in the average number of incidents annually."22
Instructions for the production of bombs have been availa-
ble in print form for decades. Congress has made no formal
attempt to restrict the supply of these publications and their sale
has remained constant. So what explains the statistically substan-
tial increase in the number of bombing incidents related to use
of bomb-making manuals? Many explanations have been dis-
States v. Arocena, 778 F.2d 943, 947 (2nd Cir. 1985) ("The FBI also found
bomb components, including thirteen timing mechanisms used in the making
of time-bombs, tools, and a bomb-making manual.")).
19. Id. at 10.
20. Internet Filters: Hearings on S. 97 Before the Comm. On Commerce, Science,
and Transp. (statement of Special Agent MarkJames, ATF Deputy Chief of Intel-
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cussed, but one variable in the dissemination process remains in
constant flux-the expansion of availability of these instruction
manuals on the Internet.
II. INTERNET IS DISTINCT FROM OTHER MEDIA
"It's a pipe, a plain old plumbing pipe, threaded ends with caps
screwed to both ends. " 23
The mechanics of building a pipe bomb (or any bomb,
really) have not changed significantly in the past twenty years.
The ingredients are readily available in most well-stocked kitch-
ens and a persistent individual could easily procure instructions
for building a bomb through mail order or a less than reputable
bookstore. However, the distribution channels for bomb-making
instruction manuals have changed dramatically since the advent
of the Internet. Although most information on the Internet is
available in hard copy, would-be bombers can now procure the
required recipes with relative ease. Although one may contend
that the Internet is no different from conventional communica-
tion mediums, the Internet is a unique environment that
demands unique analysis.
A. Distinct Communications Medium
As a technology, the Internet's potential appears unlimited.
Although society has not approached full realization of that
potential, we know that the Internet can revolutionize the way we
communicate, learn, research, and do business with each other.
As one commentator put it, "[M]ost mass technologies have not
been used as tools to improve communication in meaningful
ways, but the Internet has the potential to ... reshape 'our com-
mon culture."' 24 Internet technology alters far more than the
way we communicate in the office. The avenues for political
speech are nearly infinite. "Anyone can send email to thousands
of like-minded (or un-like-minded . . .) people, or create a Web
site... to promulgate messages on any subject one wishes-from
aardvarks to Zoroastrianism."25 From Wall Street to Main Street,
23. Steven Levy, The Senate's Bomb Scare, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1996, at 48.
Levy noted this introduction to a portion of the* Cable News Network website
discussing pipe bombs. He observed that "a diagram is helpfully supplied, and
we see where to put the powder, the fuse and even the tissue paper, which
seems to be a handy filter at the bottom of the pipe." Id.
24. JEREMEY H. LIPSHULTZ, FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET:
SocIAL AND LEGAL BOUNDARIES 2 (2000).
25. JOHN F. WIRENIus, FIRST AMENDMENT, FIRST PRINCIPLES: VERBAL Acrs
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 195 (2000).
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society is rapidly understanding the financial potential of the
Internet. One commentator observed that "[t]his revolution has
already transformed our economy .... mJust the development
of the Internet... has been responsible for an average of 35% of
the real growth of the U.S. economy from 1995 to 1998. "26 As a
communications medium, the Internet has the potential to
turbo-charge many of the educational, political, and financial
benefits that other technologies have reaped. However, the
scope of the Internet's effects is not limited to positive social
change.
With the unbridled power of the Internet come some formi-
dable concerns. As the Internet can enhance the way we commu-
nicate with each other, it can also magnify the influence of
socially undesirable elements in society. This magnification of
deleterious effects on the Internet is especially acute in the area
of violence. The debate over whether exposure to violent con-
tent through media causes violent behavior is far from
resolved.27 However, many commentators have suggested that
media outlets remain the only parties unconvinced of the con-
nection between exposure to violence and violent tendencies.28
Due to the graphic portrayals of violent content on the Internet,
the illusion that gratuitous violence is real eclipses the under-
26. Ira Magaziner, At the Crossroads of Law and Technology: Keynote Address,
33 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1165, 1166 (1999).
27. AM. PYSCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION: WHAT DO CHIL-
DREN LEARN? WHAT CAN IARENTs no?, available at http://www.apa.org/pubinfo/
violence.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2001) ("In spite of the accumulated evi-
dence, broadcasters and scientists continue to debate the link between viewing
TV violence and children's aggressive behavior. Some broadcasters believe that
there is not enough evidence to prove that TV violence is harmful. But scien-
tists who have studied this issue say there is a link between TV Violence and
aggression . . ").
28. CTR. FOR MEDIA LITERACY, VIOLENCE IN THE MEDIA, available at http://
www.medialit.org/Violence/indexviol.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2001):
For decades, media writers, directors and producers have been trying
to tell us that the violent content of the media they create also doesn't
hurt-that is, that despite its glamour and impact, it plays no role in
making this a more violent society. They may have had a case earlier
in this century, when portrayals of media violence were less believable,
but today the proliferation of realistic-looking mayhem, assault and
death makes for a totally different situation. One expert believes that
of the 25,000 murders committed in the United States every year (the
greatest number of any industrialized country) at least half are due to
the influence and desensitizing effects of media violence. At mini-
mum, media violence may be most influential in modeling the use of
deadly force as the primary, if not the only way to solve problems and
resolve interpersonal conflict.
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standing of television or the Internet as staged.29 As this revela-
tion crystallizes, the Internet comes under greater scrutiny. For
example, recent school shootings have caused parents to reassess
their beliefs about allowing their children to access the
Internet. ° "[E]ven though a growing number of parents con-
sider the Internet an essential tool to which they must expose
their children, they feel distinctly uncomfortable with the pros-
pect."'" As one parent explained it, "[t]wenty years ago . .. you
didn't have access to millions of people to mess with your head
.... What is on TV is sort of controlled. What is in the movie
theatres is sort of controlled. The influences you can be exposed
to on the Internet are just a lot more widespread." 2
The components of the causation debate regarding media
violence will continue to be parsed indefinitely."3 This Note
leaves the resolution of that debate to those more skilled in statis-
tical analysis. Assuming some threshold level of causation, the
Internet poses unique problems for social scientists researching
the connection between exposure to violence and real violence.
The Internet is a distinct organism and society must understand
the unique challenges it presents. "The development of the
29. See generally Elizabeth Thoman, TV Violence: It's Time to Break the Circle
of Blame, available at http://www.medialit.org/Violence/articles/senate.htm
(last visited Oct. 29, 2001); see also Am. PSYCHOLOGCAL ASS'N, IS YOUTH VIO-
LENCE JUST ANOTHER FACT OF LIFE, available at http://www.apa.org/pi/pii/is
youthviolence.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2001) (on record with NOTRE DAMEJ.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y); CENTER FOR MEDIA LITERACY, VIOLENCE IN THE MEDIA,
available at http://www.medialit.org/Violence/indexviol.htm (last visited Oct.
29, 2001).
30. See generally Amy Harmon, Parents Fear that Children Are One Click
Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1999, at A24.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting uncredited parent Marti Seidel of Greensboro, N.C.).
33. Despite the mounting scientific evidence establishing a connection
between media portrayals of violence and actual violence, many observers have
continued to deny a connection between the two. See, e.g., Jacob Sullum, Phan-
tom Studies, REASON, Dec. 2000, at 15 ("The majority of studies do not find evi-
dence that supports the notion that television violence causes aggression."); see
also Richard Rhodes, The Media-Violence Myth, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 23, 2000, at
55 ("The presumption that gory movies, television and games make kids violent
is based on shoddy science and shadowy motives."). However, even media
industry executives have begun recognizing the media-violence connection.
Recently, the President of Walt Disney Corporation, Robert Iger, acknowledged
the simplicity of the connection, noting that "[w]hen the finger is pointed at
[media executives], they say their media has no influence; but they turn around
and say just the opposite to advertisers. We should all admit that our media has
an influence." SeeJohn P. McCarthy, A Modest Step Toward Cleaning Up Television,
AMERICA,July 31, 1999, available at http://findarticles.com/m1321/3-181/5528
5945/pl/article.jhtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2001).
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Internet as a means of communication marks a dramatic change
in the manner in which information is exchanged and dissemi-
nated in our culture. Quickly fading are the days in which a per-
son's main venue for expressing her revolutionary views include
standing on a soapbox or distributing leaflets." 4 Although the
social changes harbored by the Internet foster an indescribable
feeling of imminence, there are specific reasons for people to be
cautious about Internet content.
B. Violent Content on the Internet More Dangerous
The Internet alters the way people receive information. In
many regards, the reasons that the Internet boosts productivity in
commerce are the same reasons that raise the danger level for
bomb-making instruction manuals. First, the "cost of entry" on
the Internet is extremely low. Whereas actors might have previ-
ously found dissemination of the bomb information cost prohibi-
tive, the Internet allows them to distribute their information with
minute entry costs. Second, the speed of communication on the
Internet is literally as fast as light. Previous to the technological
revolution, actors were required to purchase their instruction
manuals through the mail or at a book store. This process forced
at least some time for reflection before would-be bombers had
access to recipes. Third, the Internet lowers organizational barri-
ers, allowing people to coordinate violent actions. Fourth, the
Internet is anonymous and obliterates the significant impact that
social norms may have on preventing socially undesirable
behavior.
1. Low Cost of Entry
The Internet has lower financial barriers to entry than other
communication media. With lower cost of entry, organizations
or individuals bent on supplying information about bomb con-
struction can afford to communicate. In discussing a different
type of violence, racial violence, one commentator observed that
"racists have discovered that the Net is a marvelous way to get
their message out to a huge audience at low cost."3 5 For people
wishing to communicate any message, the Internet is perhaps the
most affordable communication vehicle in history. Any organiza-
tion choosing to communicate through conventional mediums
34. Bruce Braun et al., www.commercialterrorism.com: A Proposed Federal
Criminal Statute Addressing the Solicitation of Commercial Terrorism Through the
Internet, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 159 (2000).
35. Joshua Quitner & Chris Stamper, Home Pages for Hate, TIME, Jan. 22,
1996, at 69.
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(television, movies, video and mail) must incur substantial cost
burdens. Those cost burdens virtually vanish on the Internet.
Any organization opting to communicate with a broad audience
needs only an Internet connection and a list of addresses.
The reduced cost per communication on the Internet is a
cause of significant concern with violent content. In real space,
it costs money to communicate. As such, those communicating
to a large audience have the hurdle of "testing" their ideas with a
large enough audience such that people will be willing to finan-
cially support the communication. However, the cost of commu-
nicating an idea in cyberspace is negligible and many ideas are
communicated that would normally be obliterated in the free
market due to "lack of viewer interest."
This quality of the Internet is beneficial in many regards.
Ideas considered counter-majoritarian are floated like never
before. This fact secures our ability to delve into ideas that are
sound, but not popular. However, this lessened barrier of entry
often fuels promoters of violence and hatred. One pundit noted:
Although hatred-inspired violence is hardly a new develop-
ment (ask Cain), there is a dangerous new ingredient: the
Internet. In October, a homosexual group, in the course of
investigating an America Online (AOL) policy about 'objectiona-
ble' speech, discovered scores of postings on AOL advocating vio-
lence against homosexuals. Other messages called for blacks to
be lynched, Christians killed, and Jews burned. The Internet, it
appears, gives hatemongersjust what they want: a cheap device to
reach millions of new recruits.3 6
2. Faster Speed of Communication
The Internet's speed allows speakers of violent content to
communicate faster than ever before and with a substantially
larger audience. "It is now possible to send the entire contents of
the Library of Congress across the United States in under four-
teen seconds on a single optical fiber as thin as a human hair."
37
The Internet's speed fosters the potential for unprecedented
development for corporations, education institutions and gov-
ernment. Conversely, it speeds the rate of transmission for
extremists communicating a message of hatred. As one com-
mentator noted:
The Internet generation, unfortunately, is seriously at risk
of infection by this virus of hate. Not only is this virus pre-
sent on the Internet today; it is being spread around the
36. Downloading Hate, THE ECONOMIs-r, Nov. 13, 1999, at 1.
37. Magaziner, supra note 26, at 1166.
2002]
290 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16
globe, in the wink of an eye-or more accurately, in the
click of a mouse. This exciting new medium allows extrem-
ists easier access than they have ever had before to a poten-
tial audience of millions, a high percentage of whom are
young and gullible. It allows haters to find and communi-
cate cheaply and easily with like minded bigots across the
borders and oceans, to promote and recruit for their cause
while preserving their anonymity, and even to share
instructions for those seeking to act out their intolerance
in violent ways. 8
It is a given in the Internet age that anyone can communi-
cate with another person anywhere on the globe. This fact is
encouraging for business leaders, but should be concerning for
lawmakers. The hypothetical extremist once had to use the mail
or telephone to disseminate information, but the world is very
different now. Blueprints for constructing an incendiary device
are now merely a few clicks away. The Internet's speed closes the
valuable time window between a person wanting information on
bomb construction and the time they actually get the informa-
tion. The result is that there is less time for reflection in the
process. People who seek bomb-making information in a fit of
outrage can now procure that information while they are still
outraged.
3. Lower Organizational Barriers
The Internet's enhanced speed of communication lowers
organizational barriers in the free market of ideas. If a person
hypothetically wanted to organize a violent protest in the pre-
Internet era, he would have to communicate by mail, call people
on the phone, or be close enough in geographic proximity to
others to speak to them directly. Financial resources, location,
speed of mail, etc., limited the size of audience. With the
Internet, that same violent mob organizer can communicate with
a large audience simultaneously-" The size of any reachable
audience increases exponentially on the Internet. The financial
and geographic limitations on his speech disappear, and he can
speak to n' people at the same time. The only limitations on the
38. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, COMBATrING EXTREMISM IN CYBERSPACE:
THE LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING INTERNET HATE SPEECH 1 (2000).
39. See generally Alexander MacLeod, British Police Eye "www.sportshooligan.
corn," CHRISTAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 12, 1999, at 7 ("British police say they
are facing a new threat to law and order: mob violence orchestrated over the
Internet. Twice in the past two months demonstrators have used Web sites to
organize and provoke serious confrontations with law enforcement officers.").
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size of the audience are the procurement of an online account
and the preparation of an address list.
4. Lack of Social Norms
Fourth, violent content on the Internet is not encumbered
by typical social norms. As Lawrence Lessig noted, "The right to
free speech is not the right to speak for free."4 ° In our society,
one generally has the right to speak without fear of reprisal.
However, no one is ever promised that his or her idea will be well
received. In fact, most people censor their own comments daily
based on the audience with whom they are speaking. One of the
reasons people do this is for fear of an immediate response. For
example, a typical racist is unlikely to make racist remarks in a
business meeting because he fears the reprimand of his superior,
the loss of a business deal, or even the loss of his job. This con-
cern is immediate for the average racist because the universe of
people we speak to on a daily basis is generally limited to people
we know or interact with in some way. On the Internet, however,
people are known only by their web addresses or email addresses.
Even then, people hide behind pseudonyms and organizational
names. The Internet allows people to communicate with others
they might never meet or who cannot authenticate their identity.
As such, the fear of being verbally reprimanded or socially ostra-
cized for offensive speech disappears. The result is that many
people who previously espoused hatred within their tight circle
of colleagues can do so on the Internet without fear of any imme-
diate or significant response. "Before the Internet . . . many
extremists worked in relative isolation, forced to make a great
effort to connect with others who shared their ideology. Today,
on the Internet, bigots communicate easily .... Extremists have
found a secure forum in which to exchange ideas and plans."41
In this manner, the Internet poses a challenge previously unseen:
how to deal with people that can preach hatred without fear of
even a social consequence. With bomb-making instruction
manuals, the social norms deterring their publication are even
stronger. In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, few would
dare encourage or make light of the bomber's actions. On the
Internet, however, sensitivities are weakened, and the specter
increases for discussions about otherwise taboo topics.
40. LAWRENCE LESSiG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 164 (1999).
41. Downloading Hate, supra note 36, at Al (citing unspecified Anti-Defa-
mation League Publication).
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III. REGULATION
This Note argues that the best manner to ameliorate the
problem of available bomb-making instructions on the Internet is
to enforce existing aiding and abetting laws and to pass the Fein-
stein amendment. The enforcement of existing laws and the pas-
sage of the Feinstein amendment are not per se regulations on
speech. Rather, they would only be enforced to the extent that a
publisher's bomb-making instructions were used in the commis-
sion of a crime. Mere publication is not sufficient to warrant a
felony charge.
However, many critics argue that even legislating the
"effects" of Internet content is impermissible or at best impracti-
cal. Therefore, it is important to briefly acknowledge the argu-
ments in opposition to Internet regulation, and explain the
principles that counter those arguments.
A. Case Against Regulation
The primary argument against content regulation on the
Internet is feasibility. The Internet is growing exponentially on a
yearly basis and law enforcement simply moves at a slower pace.
Proponents of this argument note that Internet regulation is
inherently difficult without any central governance structure.42
Many commentators have observed that regulation of the
Internet is difficult due to the international scope of the technol-
ogy. International legal structures are often incompatible. Law
differs by locality within the United States. Internationally, the
variance is even greater. This variance can cause severe enforce-
ment problems because the transfer of information via the web
transcends those regional variations in law.
National speech restrictions can be enforced directly only
within the territory to which they apply. But the net is global,
and so is the flow of information. People who disseminate infor-
mation through the Net that is illegal in one country can easily
transfer their operations to another country without similar
prohibitions and effectively reorganize their disseminating action
in matters of hours.43
42. Elizabeth M. Shea, Note, The Children's Internet Protection Act of 1999: Is
Internet Filtering Software the Answer?, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 167, 178 (1999)
("Because there is no 'single point at which the Internet is administered,' it is
not technically feasible for any single entity to control the immense amount of
information being transmitted via the Internet.").
43. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Teree E. Foster, A Regulatory Web: Free
Speech and the Global Information Infrastructure, 3 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv.
45 (1997), available at http://www/mttlr.org/volthree/foster.pdf ("In the world
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The feasibility argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, regulation of the Internet appears virtually inevitable. As
the economy becomes increasingly dependent on digital commu-
nications, rules governing every topic from intellectual property
to electronic signatures have and will continue to evolve. Sec-
ond, the possibility than an operation can move internationally
does not seem to justify why laws should not be enforced in the
United States. There are multiple forms of analogous crimes
that the United States continues to enforce. One example is
money laundering. Savvy criminals can easily transfer their oper-
ations off-shore to avoid the sanction of U.S. law. However, these
laws continue to exist on the books and people continue to be
prosecuted under them. Third, a diminished rate of successful
prosecution does not challenge the legitimacy of the law. Even
though the Internet forum may be more difficult to regulate
than other media, regulation will invariably eviscerate some
amount of criminal activity. The success rate of prosecutions
may be lessened by the Internet structure, but the slightest modi-
cum of success at all furthers the goal of the statutory
framework.44
The second argument employed by opponents to Internet
regulation is the possibility that domestic regulation will spillover
to foreign countries and vice versa.45 These advocates suggest, for
example, that Chinese regulation of Internet content does not
only implicate Chinese citizens. Rather, Chinese regulations may
affect the course of business for a U.S. citizen operating a website
within the United States. The spillover scenario contemplates a
situation where the U.S. citizen's website has material that is
objectionable by Chinese standards. In this scenario, the U.S. cit-
izen could be subjected to Chinese regulations even though he
never operated in China, and he may have never conceived of
Chinese citizens as his primary audience.
A different variation of the spillover argument presumes
that sovereign entities may be forced to massively restrict the
total flow of information to its citizenry in order to curtail offen-
sive material.
Because controlling the flow of electrons across physical
boundaries is so difficult, a local jurisdiction that seeks to prevent
of a global information infrastructure, an escalating national dejure regulation
of speech meets a similarly pervasive de facto futility of enforcement."). See also
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. Rav. 1367, 1371-73 (1996).
44. Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial
Sovereignty, 5 IND.J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 475, 481-83 (1998).
45. SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 43, at 1394.
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its citizens from accessing specific materials must either outlaw
all access to the Net-thereby cutting itself off from the new
global trade-or seek to impose its will on the Net as a whole.4 6
If the spillover scenario becomes fully manifested, legal
maneuvering on the Internet would be untenable. One com-
mentator referred to this scenario as the "modem equivalent of a
local lord in medieval times either trying to prevent the silk trade
from passing through his boundaries. .. or purporting to assert
jurisdiction over the entire known world."4 7
The spillover argument is of greater concern than the feasi-
bility argument. In fact, the argument has played out in reality
with regard to Internet content. Last year, a French court ruled
that Yahoo, a California-based corporation, must remove Nazi
paraphernalia from its website or at a minimum block access to
French citizens.48 The Yahoo website hosted an auction that
offered "more than 1,000 Nazi objects for sale . . . available to
anyone in the world-including the French-with a credit card
and a click of the mouse."49 The imposition of French law on a
U.S.-based corporation is not negligible. If Yahoo was unable to
block access to the Nazi paraphernalia, they may have been force
to pay "$14,000 for each day" it maintained the Nazi parapherna-
lia on the site.50 This spillover forced Yahoo to make a very diffi-
cult strategic choice. Hypothetically, were a technological fix to
take a year, Yahoo had to choose between shutting down French
access to the site thereby forgoing countless dollars of revenue or
ignore the French court and pay nearly $5,000,000 (annualized)
in fines. Ultimately, Yahoo developed "software to scan entries
submitted for auction" allowing the company to comply with the
French order.51 The Yahoo example is an isolated demonstra-
tion of the spillover argument. However, spillover has occurred
in other places as well.52 The real question is how significant the
46. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1394 (1996).
47. Id.
48. SeeJenny Oh, French Court Gives Yahoo More Time, THE STANDARD, July
25, 2000, available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,17082,00.
html (last visited Apr. 24, 2001).
49. Angela Doland, French Oppose Yahoo! on Nazi Items, ASSOCIATED PRESS
WIRE, July 24, 2000, available at http://www.nd.edu/-phellia/yahoozedit.htm.
50. See George A. Chidi, Nazi Ban Goes into Effect on Yahoo Auctions,
INFOWORLD DAILY NEWS, Jan. 10, 2001.
51. Id.
52. See Doland, supra note 49, at 2 ("A German court also heard one of
the Internet's first major test cases, in which the former head of the Com-
puServe online service in that country was prosecuted for failing to block access
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impact will be and whether the spillover is genuinely unique to
the Internet.
Despite its empirical occurrence, the effects of the spillover
argument may be overstated. One commentator notes, "[T]his
quagmire [the spillover scenario] is much less significant than it
appears." 3 The reason the spillover argument is exaggerated is
that nations still must prove jurisdiction in order to hear a case.
With traditional norms of legal sovereignty, "a nation cannot
enforce its laws against an individual content provider from
another country unless the content provider has a local pres-
ence."5" Therefore, should a U.S. citizen never establish any con-
nection to China (either by location or targeted commerce), it
appears difficult to understand how this hypothetical person
would fall under the ambit of Chinese law. "The vast majority of
individuals who transact on the Internet have no presence or
assets in the jurisdictions that wish to regulate their information
flows."55
Spillover is a real concern for Internet regulation. However,
policy makers must be cognizant of the fact that legal spillover
occurs in many areas of the law beyond Internet regulation. Cit-
ing the inevitability of attempts to regulate content on the
Internet, one observer noted:
Even assuming the worst about the feasibility of geographic
content control of Internet information flows, spillover
effects caused by territorial regulation of the Internet do
not undermine the legitimacy of such regulation. As the
traditional territorialists realized, spillover effects are an
inevitable consequence of unilateral territorial regulation.
For example: When a security sold legally in Japan violates
U.S. securities laws, the application of the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the U.S. securities regulations produce spillover
effects by making this extraterritorial activity more costly,
and by diminishing the force of Japanese law on Japanese
soil. If instead Japanese law governed the situation, per-
sons in the United States would have been harmed and
U.S. regulations undermined. The same point applies to
the unilateral regulation of the Internet. Spillovers are
present when activity deemed legal in one country causes
to child pornography sites. Found guilty in 1998 of distributing illegal pornog-
raphy, Felix Somm's conviction was overturned last November.").
53. Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial
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harm deemed illegal in another, regardless of which
nation's law applies. 6
Given that regulation of the Internet appears inevitable,
minor restrictions on content such as the proposed Feinstein
amendment, will do little to cause the cascading of regulation
that some fear.
The third argument against regulation on the Internet is
that there is no prime justification for it. Commentators have
observed that regulation of other media had a technical justifica-
tion for regulation: limited bandwidth. "[G] overnments initially
regulated broadcast media because there was a similar problem
with respect to competition due to the limited amount of spec-
trum available. The government became involved in the alloca-
tion of the broadcast spectrum and therefore it regulated it
because it was conferring an economic value." 7 In the absence
of any constraint on the capacity of the media, the argument
goes, the government should not attempt to regulate activity on
the Internet.
The justification argument has substantial merit when it
comes to economic regulation of the Internet. Social interests in
curtailing socially undesirable expression are the impetus for
most proposals for content restriction on the Internet. To that
extent, there are few economic justifications for the vast majority
of contemplated regulation on the Internet. In fact, many con-
tent restrictions might have economically deleterious conse-
quences for content providers. The justification argument is,
however, of limited assistance in the context of bomb-making
instruction manuals. Whereas the government has limited or
even no interest in regulating who has access to the Internet, the
government does have an interest in prosecuting those who vio-
late federal aiding and abetting laws.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNET REGULATION
"Only an idiot would deny that 'The Terrorist's Handbook' is a
frightening document. But if we are to embrace the Internet's
gifts-a bounty of information delivered instantly-we must also
accept that not all forms of electronic speech will be constructive.
We must also remember that the issue is not weapons, but speech.
If someone is sufficiently motivated to kill, does it really make a
56. See Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 488.
57. Magaziner, supra note 26, at 1174.
BOMB-MAKING MANUALS ON THE INTERNET
difference if the fatal blueprints are acquired by mail order, in a
library or on the Web. ,"~8
"[T]hese bombs [sic] are there for one reason and one
reason only, and that is a criminal purpose .... None of
this is for use in any constructive civilian or military
project."59
First Amendment jurisprudence is constantly in flux. Since
as recently as 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified five
categories of speech that do not qualify as protected speech.
Working within this framework, the Court has rarely dealt with
First Amendment issues in the new Internet medium. Because
much content on the Internet is pure, unadulterated speech, the
Court and the Congress now have an opportunity to test the
boundaries of speech protection. Bomb-making manuals on the
Internet are a prime battle ground for such a test because the
issue shepherds a critical public policy debate-how much
speech protection is the country willing to give up in order to
prevent large-scale bombing massacres?
A. First Amendment Jurisprudence Ambiguous
First Amendmentjurisprudence has been likened to a patch-
work.6° Although most people recognize the significance of the
First Amendment, few seem to comprehend the existing body of
law created by the Supreme Court. "The Supreme Court has
established not one test, or even several related tests to measure
the degree of protection accorded to speech, but rather a series
of pigeonholes into which various forms of expressive conduct
are slotted."61 Although many are satisfied with the workable
exceptions to free speech created by the court, the protections
themselves are fragile when society ventures into a new media.
As one commentator observed, "The appropriate degree of pro-
tection to be extended to the conduct depends upon into which
pigeonhole the speech at issue is fitted."62 Needless to say, any
proposal to regulate speech on the Internet must appropriately
navigate the Court's current First Amendment regime.
As is commonly understood, the First Amendment does not
secure the right of free speech absolutely.6" The Supreme Court
58. See Levy, supra note 23.
59. Debra Gersh Hernandez, Bomb-making on the Internet, EDrrOR & PUB-
LISHER, June 24, 1995, at 38 (quoting Senator Dianne Feinstein).
60. WIRENIUS, supra note 25, at 72-73.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 73.
63. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942):
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has carved out five major exceptions to the First Amendment.
Any regulation that prohibits the specific content of certain
forms of speech must fall into one of these categories. First, the
Supreme Court has permitted content regulations on obscenity.
In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court held that governments
were permitted to regulate obscenity that, "taken as a whole,
appeal [s] to the prurient interest in sex, which portray[s] sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way, and which . . .do[es] not
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."64 Sec-
ond, the Court deemed "fighting words" to be unprotected
speech. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court permitted con-
tent restrictions on speech that "by [its] very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."65
Third, the Court found restrictions on libel to be constitutionally
permissible. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court held that
libelous statements "can claim no talismanic immunity from con-
stitutional limitations."66 Fourth, the Court held that commer-
cial speech does not receive the full measure of First Amendment
protection. In Ohralik v. Ohio, the Court held that commercial
speech only holds "a limited measure of protection, commensu-
rate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amend-
ment values."67 And most germane to the argument of this Note,
the Court has afforded no protection to words that are likely to
incite imminent lawless action.
Those attempting to regulate violent content have necessa-
rily positioned themselves under the incitement test from United
States v. Brandenburg.68 In Brandenburg, the Court held that a
State is not permitted to "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action."69 The Brandenburg test is
rarely applicable where a speaker discusses the use of violence
because most speakers merely advocate the use of violence alone
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words-those by which their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Id..
64. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
65. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
66. 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
67. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
68. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
69. Id. at 447.
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rather than advocating the use of violence in conjunction with a
plan to act violently. However, this standard is not readily appli-
cable to bomb-making instructions on the Internet. Bomb-mak-
ing manuals on the Internet focus on instructing others in the
means to resort to violence and rarely contain any significant
words of advocacy.
In Brandenburg, the Court dealt with a criminal syndicalism
statute that tried to punish mere advocacy. 71 In confronting the
issue the Court held the statute unconstitutional on the grounds
that it "purport[ed] to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on
pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to
advocate the described type of action." 7' The Brandenburg Court
continued by making an often over-looked distinction between
advocating the use of force and preparing others for violent
action. 72 The imminence and incitement tests of Brandenburg are
not necessary hurdles to overcome for the lawmaker wanting to
regulate mere preparation for an act of violence. As such, the
courts have evaluated a series of "instruction" or "how-to" cases
differently than they have mere advocacy cases.7 3 The series of
instruction manual cases are crucial to understanding how
bomb-making instructions on the Internet can be regulated.
However, the series is often ignored when discussing the excep-
tions to First Amendment protection.
B. Internet Is an Excellent Test Vehicle for Limits and Constraints
on First Amendment
The First Amendment is the greatest bastion of individual
freedom. With few exceptions, people in the United States are
secure in their political advocacy; free from fear of governmental
repression. The distinctly American tradition of free speech will
undoubtedly survive whatever challenges the digital age places in
its way. However, the tradition of free expression comes with a
commensurate responsibility to use discretion in the content of
speech. Often, new technologies upset the equilibrium of what it
considered acceptable and unacceptable. One commentator
noted that "[t]echnology always moves ahead of society's moral
70. Id. at 449.
71. Id.
72. DEPARTMENT OFJUsTICE, supra note 1, at 23. ("The Court drew a sharp
distinction between 'the mere abstract teaching .. . of the moral propriety or
even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence' and 'preparing a group
for violent action and steeling it to such action.") (quoting Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98
(1961)).
73. See infra, PART V.B.1.
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and ethical judgments, giving rise to a cultural lag."74 As the
technology changes, people become unsettled as the moral judg-
ment of the community and the law attempt to catch up with the
changes wrought by new technology. In the American tradition,
the free speech implications of technology are being debated
with a vigor not previously seen with other technologies. "The
TV wars are over. The new wars are going to be brutal."75
The brutality of the First Amendment debate over the
Internet stems from the fact that the Internet is "a vehicle for
core, 'raw' political speech."76 At first blush, the fact that tech-
nology automatically preserves a "record" of speech betrays the
difficulty in deciphering which types of speech are outside consti-
tutionally permissible boundaries. The courts have not provided
a great deal of guidance on this issue either. The dearth of direc-
tion from the judiciary exists even with legal issues that have well-
developed non-Internet analogues (e.g. hate speech). "Although
the intersection of law and the Internet promises to be one of the
more fascinating legal developments in the early part of the 21st
century, to date relatively few court cases have addressed hate
speech on the Internet." "
Because the Internet has the ability to fundamentally alter
the way we interact with one another, "free expression is at an
important crossroads." 78 As expected, positions are nearly
polarized with some parties advocating zero restriction on
Internet speech and others arguing for heavy regulation. As in
most situations, the real debate will occur somewhere in the mid-
dle of these positions. The Internet is uniquely different from
any other previous media. However, nothing in the structure of
the Internet justifies an abandonment of the basic principles of
First Amendmentjurisprudence. "The point to remember is that
basic constitutional principles do not arise and disappear as each
new technology comes on the scene."79 In fact, part of the value
74. Gloria Goodale, Battles Over Media Violence Move to a New Frontier: The
Internet, CHRITASrAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1996, at 10 (quoting Richard
Gelles, director of the Family Violence Research Program at the University of
Rhode Island).
75. Id.
76. LIPSHULTZ, supra note 24, at 11.
77. AN rI-DEFAMTION LEAGUE, supra note 38, at 6.
78. LipSHULTZ, supra note 24, at 2.
79. Tribe, supra note 14, at A29. Professor Tribe humorously notes that
the Supreme Court has learned from experience not to conjure up a new cate-
gory of jurisprudence for every technology. He observed that "[e] arly in the
20th century, the Supreme Court expressed doubt that free-speech principles
had any application at all to motion pictures, and in 1981, Justice Byron White
BOMB-MAKING MANUALS ON THE INTERNET
of our First Amendment is that its protection transcends the tar-
get forum and quality of speech.80
While preserving our most fundamental principles, we must
be mindful that First Amendmentjurisprudence is less clear than
we like to pretend.
There has not actually yet evolved a juridical consensus as
to how the First Amendment immunizes (or fails to immu-
nize) speech on this new and somewhat intimidating
medium .... [T] he issues are still so new that no distinct
'majority' view has had time for its views to set in the public
imagination. 1
A portion of this ambiguity in First Amendment jurispru-
dence and the Internet is caused by the fact that the technology
is simply too new for any real consensus to emerge. Supreme
Court Justice David Souter went so far as to say, "In my igno-
rance, I have to accept the possibility that if we had to decide
today just what the First Amendment should mean in cyberspace,
we would get it fundamentally wrong.
8 s2
However confusing the First Amendment's application to
cyberspace, we must note that the judiciary is used to dealing
with this type of confusion. "New media have repeatedly
presented challenges to the First Amendment . . . that have
clouded the jurisprudence and diminished only as society... has
grown familiar and more accepting of them." 3 For this very rea-
son, regulation of violent content on the Internet provides a bril-
liant test case for First Amendment law. "In terms of legal issues,
the Internet provides unique opportunities to better unveil the
limitations of and constraints on free expression."8 4
V. AIDING AND ABETTING
The primary mechanism for aiding and abetting prosecu-
tions is 18 U.S.C. § 2,85 which contains general provisions for aid-
ing and abetting. "That statute in its essence provides that 'those
introduced his analysis of a law regulating outdoor billboard advertising by say-
ing, 'We deal here with the law of billboards.'" Id.
80. Id. ("The same First Amendment that safeguards the right of Nazis to
march through Skokie protects the right of an adult to put virtual machine
guns aimed at lifelike human targets on his or her computer screen.")
81. WIRENIUS, supra note 25, at 196.
82. LIPSHULTZ, supra note 24, at 2 (quoting Justice David Souter of the
United States Supreme Court in 1997).
83. WIRENIUS, supra note 25, at 182.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Specific analysis of the proposed Feinstein amendment under 18
U.S.C. § 2 is discussed infra, Part V.B.2.
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who provide knowing aid to persons committing federal crimes,
with the intent to facilitate the crime, are themselves committing
the crime."' 86 Although courts have found people guilty of aid-
ing and abetting in analogous situations,87 "there is some ques-
tion whether aiding and abetting culpability can ever rest solely
on the basis of general publication of instructions on how to
commit a crime.""8 Although somewhat unconventional in anal-
ysis, the best vehicle for effectively combating the dissemination
of bomb manuals on the Internet is through enhancements to
current aiding and abetting laws.
A. Aiding and Abetting Statutes
The distribution of bomb-making manuals over the Internet
poses a very different First Amendment question than other
forms of violent content. With bomb-making manuals, more
than advocacy is conveyed. Rather, the manuals provide a pre-
cise set of directions for creating and detonating devices in con-
travention of innumerable federal, state and local laws. One
critic observed that distributing bomb-making guides is "not
quite like yelling 'Fire' in a theatre; they do not cause harm in a
purely reflexive or automatic manner. Instead, they change the
mix of ideas and information in the heads of the speaker's audi-
ence." 9 To this end, bomb-making instructions are unlikely by
themselves to meet the imminence and incitement tests of Bran-
denburg. But, despite the fact that they are entitled to some pro-
tection, they are:
not entitled to the same level of protection to which
speech advocating ideas is entitled because it is rarely part
of any dialogue about what is true or what ought to be
done. Distributing such materials doesn't try to persuade
anyone to take a course of action, but instead provides the
means for committing a crime.90
Therefore, policy makers can employ traditional avenues of
prosecution for offenders enabling others to commit crimes with
instruction manuals.
To prosecute under a conspiracy charge, the government
must prove that the actor did more than simply provide bomb-
86. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 12 (quoting the U.S. Supreme
Court holding in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Den-
ver, 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994)).
87. See infra Part V.B.2.
88. Id.
89. Tribe, supra note 14, at A29.
90. Id.
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making information.9 1 The DOJ has observed the improbability
of successfully prosecuting a disseminator under existing conspir-
acy statutes. 92 To that extent, this Note argues that the best alter-
native for regulating this content is through existing aiding and
abetting statutes and the proposed Feinstein amendment.
B. Development of Instructional Advocacy Jurisprudence
The courts have substantially developed instructional advo-
cacy jurisprudence over the previous fifty years. It is important to
understand the evolution of jurisprudence on the general topic
of "instruction manuals" in order to extrapolate holdings to the
Internet context. In a series of holdings, the judicial system
affirmed that speech is not protected if it is the vehicle of the
crime. In this regard, the aiding and abetting statutes provide
the most feasible means of prosecuting people who provide the
means, and in some cases justification, for others to build and
utilize explosive devices.
1. Speech Unprotected Where Vehicle of the Crime
In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., the Court held that the
right to free speech does not extend to the commission of illegal
ends.9" In Giboney, a union attempted to build support for a
picket by inducing ice distributors to stop selling ice to nonunion
ice retailers.94 The Court awarded the Giboney plaintiffs an
injunction that prohibited union members from picketing
around a particular building. The defendants claimed that the
pickets were a constitutionally permissible form of free speech in
that they were attempting "peacefully to publicize truthful facts
about a labor dispute."9" However, the Court found that the
speech could not be isolated in a vacuum. Although the union
actions involved speech, they were part of a concerted effort to
"compel Empire to agree to stop selling ice to nonunion ped-
dlers,"96 an offense under Missouri law at the time. Noting that
the injunction did littde more than prevent the defendants from
breaking a state law, the Court observed that "[i] t has rarely been
suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press
extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part
91. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 11.
92. Id.
93. Giboney v. Empire Ice & Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
94. Id. at 494.
95. Id. at 498.
96. Id.
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of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute."97 The Court's
holding in Giboney set the course for regulating speech that effec-
tively breaks the law or aids others in so doing. Other courts
have used the rhetoric of the Giboney decision in similar cases.
In Ohralik v. Ohio, the Court affirmed the previous holding
in Giboney and noted that criminal conduct is no less criminal
simply because it takes the form of words.9" In Ohralik, the
defendant was an attorney who made an in-person solicitation
for legal services to the victim of a car accident in the hospital.99
The rules of the Ohio Bar prohibited such in-person solicita-
tions, and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Disci-
pline of the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the defendant
was guilty of violating the rules and sanctioned him with a public
reprimand. The defendant contended that the First Amend-
ment protected his speech. The Court recited its rhetoric from
Giboney that speech "used as an integral part of conduct in viola-
tion of a criminal statute" does not fall within the ambit of consti-
tutional protection. 00  The Court's decision in Ohralik is
significant because it appears to be one of the first occasions
after Giboney where the notion of criminal "speech acts" was
affirmed.
The Court continued to maintain the distinction between
advocacy speech and speech as an instrument in the facilitation
of a criminal offense. In Brown v. Hartlage, the Court held that
although an agreement to commit an illegal offense may contain
associational elements, the use of words alone does not secure
First Amendment protection."' 1 In Brown, a local political candi-
date made a promise to raise the salaries of certain government
officials if he was elected.10 2 A state law prohibited the practice
of promising material benefits to electors in exchange for votes.
Although the candidate retracted the promise, he was later sued
for violation of the state law. At trial, the candidate maintained
that his promise was protected by the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court disagreed and held that whatever advocacy value
his speech had was severely trumped by the criminal elements
involved in it. The Court noted that "[a] lthough agreements to
engage in illegal conduct undoubtedly possess some element of
association, the State may ban such illegal agreements without
97. Id.
98. 436 U.S. 447.
99. Id. at 449.
100. Id. at 456 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Ice & Storage Co., 336 U.S.
490, 502 (1949)).
101. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
102. Id. at 47.
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trenching on any right of association protected by the First
Amendment."10 3 The Court went on to note that "[t]he fact that
such an agreement necessarily takes the form of words does not
confer upon it, or upon the underlying conduct, the constitu-
tional immunities that the First Amendment extends to
speech."10 4 After Brown, the Court's opinion on the unprotected
nature of speech used in the facilitation of a criminal offense was
clear. Successive cases upheld and proverbially codified the
Court's position.
1 0 5
C. Bomb-Making Manuals as Aiding and Abetting
1. Instruction Manuals as Proof
The most notable decisions finding publishers of instruction
manuals guilty of aiding and abetting dealt with tax evasion and
drug manufacturing. These decisions were handed down in the
late 1970's and early 1980's. It took until 1997 for the analytical
reasoning to be applied to fact patterns similar to the publication
of bomb-making instructions.
In 1978, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down
its decision in United States v. Buttorff1 °6 In Buttorff the defend-
ants held several public and private meetings with employees of a
tractor plant in Iowa. At the meetings, the defendants chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the graduated income tax and rec-
ommended the filing of false income tax returns.107 As a
consequence of the meetings, several attendees testified that
"they submitted false or fraudulent forms because of the defend-
ants' recommendations, advice or suggestions."'10' The defend-
ants were charged and convicted of criminal aiding and abetting
under 18 U.S.C. § 2, and asserted a First Amendment defense on
appeal. In affirming the conviction, the Buttorff court noted that
explanations of how to avoid withholding of taxes went "beyond
mere advocacy of tax reform.""0 9 The language in the decision is
subtle, but started a demonstrable break from the traditional
103. Id. at 55.
104. Id.
105. See Obsborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990) (quoting Giboney v.
Empire Ice & Storage, Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 762 (1982) (quoting Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498); United States v. Varani,
435 F. 2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) ("Contrary to the apparent logic of appel-
lant's contention, speech is not protected by the First Amendment when it is
the very vehicle of the crime itself.").
106. 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978).
107. Id. at 622.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 624.
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analysis that the Supreme Court established in Brandenburg. The
Buttorff court noted that the Supreme Court "has distinguished
between speech which merely advocates law violation and speech
which incites imminent lawless activity .... The former is pro-
tected; the latter is not."' l Given the citation to the Brandenburg
distinction, it would appear that the inquiry should have
stopped. However, the Buttorff court went further. It noted that
"[a]lthough the speeches here do not incite the type of immi-
nent lawless activity referred to in criminal syndicalism cases, the
defendants did go beyond mere advocacy of tax reform." i1 ' The
significance of the dichotomy should not be overlooked. The
Buttorff court suggested that the threshold for constitutionally
unprotected lawless advocacy may be lower than that mandated
in Brandenburg. In essence, the Buttorff court intimated the
notion of some middle ground of activity that is more than mere
advocacy and less than that which would incite imminent lawless
activity. Although a subtle distinction in the context of the But-
torff decision, courts in later years have embraced the concept.
Less than two years after the Buttorffdecision, the Eighth Cir-
cuit heard a case with strikingly similar factual circumstances. In
United States v. Moss," 2 the defendant was convicted of criminal
aiding and abetting after he gave speeches challenging the con-
stitutionality of federal income tax laws. As in Buttorff the princi-
pals in the case asserted that the defendant's speeches motivated
them to file fraudulent income tax returns. 1 3 The defendant
claimed that he was merely "espous [ing] a political cause aimed
at changing the tax law in the United States."1 14 Again, however,
the First Amendment defense to this type of activity did not per-
suade the Eighth Circuit. Rather than parsing the individual ten-
ets of the defendant's defense, the court merely quoted in block
from Buttorff and affirmed the conviction. 1
These two tax evasion cases could have been isolated uses of
criminal aiding and abetting laws against publishers of instruc-
tions on how to violate the law. Both cases originated and were
resolved within the Eighth Circuit. Both cases dealt with tax
fraud and involved personal contact with the primary criminal
actors. However, the use of aiding and abetting laws to combat
criminal "how-to" manuals spread to the Ninth Circuit only two
years later.
110. Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
111. Id.
112. United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1979).
113. Id. at 570.
114. Id. at 571.
115. Id.
BOMB-MAKING MANUALS ON THE INTERNET
In United States v. Barnett,"6 the Ninth Circuit heard the
appeal of a defendant charged under aiding and abetting laws
with disseminating an instruction manual for making
phencyclidine (PCP). In Barnett, the police arrested the suspect
for possession of PCP and related paraphernalia, including an
instruction manual entitled Synthesis of PCP-Preparation of Angel
Dust." 7 After interrogating the suspect, the police discovered
that he had ordered the manual through the mail from a period-
ical. The suspect provided the police with the name and address
of the defendant, who supplied him with the manual. After
investigating the periodical, the police identified the defendant
as the author of the material and charged him with violating 18
U.S.C. § 2. In his defense, the defendant maintained that he had
a First Amendment "right to disseminate and exchange this
information through the mails even if the recipients use the
same for unlawful purposes."11 The First Amendment defense
did not move the court. Rather, it challenged the syllogism on
which the argument was based. The Court noted that:
Barnett appears to argue as follows: (1) The [F]irst
[A] mendment protects speech including the printed word.
(2) Barnett sells printed instructions for the manufacture
of phencyclidine. (3) Therefore, the First Amendment
protects Barnett's sale of printed instructions for the man-
ufacture of phencyclidine. This specious syllogism finds
no support in the law.' 19
The court went on to note that "[t]he [F]irst [A]mendment
does not provide a defense to a criminal charge simply because
the actor uses words to carry out his illegal purpose.' 20 Most
significantly, the Ninth Circuit cited the decision in United States
v. Buttorff as the guiding precedent for the decision.
12'
In applying this series of decisions, many commentators
have remained skeptical about the application of aiding and
abetting laws to those who distribute to the public at large, with
limited knowledge of the actual recipients/principal criminal
offenders. The Barnett court dealt with this issue by referring to
the Buttorff decision. The court noted that in Buttorff "the
defendants had virtually no personal contact with the persons
who filed the false income tax returns."1 2 2 Rather, the inquiry
116. United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
117. Id. at 837.
118. Id. at 842.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 842-43.
122. Id at 843.
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turns on traditional notions of aiding and abetting: whether or
not the publisher shared in some way with the intent to commit a
crime.
2. Rice v. Paladin
When the DOJ produced its 1997 report, it relied heavily on
a district court opinion in Rice v. Paladin.123 In Rice, the district
court granted summary judgment for a publisher of a book enti-
tled "Hit Man" which gave systematic instructions on how to
assassinate persons without detection. The plaintiff in Rice filed a
wrongful death action against the publisher of the book, Paladin,
after a reader of the book committed a triple murder.1 24 In its
decision, the district court applied the Brandenburg incitement
standard and held that the instruction manual was constitution-
ally protected under the First Amendment. 25 When the DOJ
published its advisory opinion on the constitutionality of regulat-
ing bomb-making instructions on the Internet, it noted that in
light of Rice v. Paladin, "it is necessary to consider carefully the
First Amendment questions that a statute like the Feinstein
Amendment would raise."126 The DOJ unfortunately did not
have the luxury of waiting for the appeals process to run its
course. Within seven months of the publication of the DOJ
report, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision in
Rice v. Paladin.1 27 This new decision veritably rolled out the red
carpet for adoption of the Feinstein Amendment.
In an extensive opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's decision in Rice. The court began its
opinion with an abridged reprint of the "Hit Man" publica-
tion. 128 After incredulously reviewing the findings of fact in the
lower court,129 the court held:
123. 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996).
124. Id. at 838.
125. Id. at 846.
126. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 1, at 18.
127. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
128. Id. at 235-39. The court's recitation of the content of the "Hit Man"
publication is significant. As a student reading the constitutional issues
involved in this area of the law, it is easy to forget about the content itself.
Although First Amendment jurisprudence appears to be predicated on the
assumption that one's particular opinion of certain content is irrelevant to the
constitutional decision calculus, reading the content is important to under-
stand the advocacy value of any form of speech.
129. Id. at 242.
Notwithstanding Paladin's extraordinary stipulations that it not only
knew that its instructions might be used by murderers, but that it actu-
ally intended to provide assistance to murderers and would-be murder-
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Because long-established caselaw provides that speech-
even speech by the press-that constitutes criminal aiding
and abetting does not enjoy the protection of the First
Amendment, and because we are convinced that such
caselaw is both correct and equally applicable to speech
that constitutes civil aiding and abetting of criminal con-
duct... we hold ... that the First Amendment does not
pose a bar to a finding that Paladin is civilly liable as an
aider and abettor.
1 30
The Rice court based its decision largely on the series of deci-
sions holding that words can be used to aid or abet the commis-
sion of a criminal offense.1 3 1 The court observed that "it has
never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the con-
duct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed.
132
3. Prosecution Under Rice v. Paladin Theory
a. Prosecution Under Existing Laws
Although federal prosecutors are gun-shy in the wake of
Reno v. ACLU, they should feel comfortable if prosecuting pub-
lishers of these manuals today. The Rice decision opened the
door for prosecution of these perpetrators. Until Rice, prosecu-
tors had difficulty overcoming First Amendment challenges and
proving the requisite intent for aiding and abetting. Fortunately
for them, authors that publish this type of information on the
Internet often brandish their intentions on their web page.
Although intent is still difficult to prove, federal prosecutors have
much fodder with which to work.
Under the Rice decision, prosecutors can successfully prose-
cute a publisher of aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a). 133 Section 2(a) provides that "[w]hoever commits an
offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, com-
ers which would be used by them 'upon receipt,' and that it in fact
assisted Perry in particular in the commission of the murders... the
district court granted Paladin's motion for summary judgment.
Id.
130. Id. at 242-43.
131. Id. at 244 ("Indeed, every court that has addressed the issue, includ-
ing this court, has held that the First Amendment does not necessarily pose a
bar to liability for aiding and abetting a crime, even when such aiding and abet-
ring takes the form of the spoken or written word.").
132. Id. at 243 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 498 (1949).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000).
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mands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal."1 3 4 To prove the case for aiding and abetting, the gov-
ernment must prove that the defendant had a 'purposeful atti-
tude' and participated in the unlawful action in some manner.
135
After the Rice decision, prosecutors can build this case in an
incremental fashion. First, citing the Giboney-Ohralik-Brown tril-
ogy, prosecutors can defeat any First Amendment challenges.
Because speech used as the vehicle of a crime is not protected
speech, prosecutors need only demonstrate that providing an
instruction manual is deemed to be participation in the criminal
act. Second, prosecutors can employ the Buttorff-Moss-Barnett tril-
ogy as precedent for convicting criminals of aiding and abetting
under 18 U.S.C. § 2 for providing instructions on how to commit
a crime. Once prosecutors demonstrate that instruction manuals
are unprotected speech and can satisfy an aiding and abetting
charge, prosecutors have a more difficult hurdle to leap. "A
harder question is whether aiding and abetting can be estab-
lished with even less direct connection between the aider and the
principals."136 However, prosecutors are strongly positioned on
this argument for two reasons. First, the government successfully
prosecuted the Barnett and Buttorffdefendants although the aider
had limited or no personal contact with the principals. No cyber-
space case has yet suggested that aiding and abetting principals
are different on the Internet than in real space. Second,
Internet publishers have a tendency to wear their intentions on
their sleeves. Perhaps the anonymity of the Internet provides
false security to web publishers, but this Note has argued that
web publishers feel few constraints about voicing their true moti-
vations. For example, one instruction manual site opened with
the phrase, "This site was designed for everyone who have [sic]
been victimized or wronged in any way. Here you will find
revenge schemes, tactics, ideas, tips and guidance that would
scare or pester most offenters [sic] into surrender."3 7 This type
of boldness is not uncommon on the Internet. 38 As the courts
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Baumgarten, 517 F.2d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 878 (1975).
136. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 33 n. 24.
137. AVENGER'S FRONT PAGE 1, available at http://www.ekran.no/html/
revenge/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2001)
138. The sociology behind the boldness is curious. Some web publishers
appear to feel they are a voice for the silent masses. By publishing instruction
manuals on the Internet, they somehow participate in a grander scheme ofjus-
tice. One site prefaced the manual with a quote from Genghis Kahn saying,
"Oh people, know that you have committed great sins. If you ask me what
proof I have for these words, I say it is because I am the punishment of God. If
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have eased the magnitude of specific intent required for aiding
and abetting, similar statements will undoubtedly help build suc-
cessful cases of intent.
b. Adoption of the Modified Feinstein Amendment
The DOJ proposed the adoption of the Feinstein Amend-
ment with modifications.1"9 The DOJ's formulation was different
in two significant regards. First, it narrowed the intent require-
ment such that a defendant must have a specific purpose of
"facilitating criminal conduct" or they must know that a "particu-
lar recipient intends to make improper use of the material." 4 '
Second, the modified proposal broadened the scope of illegal
offenses by including information on the "use" of explosives as
distinct from information on the mere "creation" of explo-
sives."' These proposed revisions are modest, but substantially
lessen the possibility of a First Amendment challenge while
increasing the number of perpetrators that can be charged
under the statute.
The DOJ proposed its revisions over three years ago. Noth-
ing in the legislative history of the Feinstein Amendment sug-
gests that Congress has even looked at the legislation since it was
killed in committee. However weary Congress may be with regu-
lating the Internet, action is needed to plug this hole in our aid-
ing and abetting jurisprudence. Congress should adopt the
revised Feinstein Amendment in whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
World Trade Center, New York City. Murrah Federal Build-
ing, Oklahoma City. Columbine High School, Littleton. Three
very public massacres should remind us of the dangers of pub-
licly disseminating bomb-making information. In two of those
situations, there was strong evidence that perpetrators procured
explosives information from the Internet. Congress and federal
prosecutors should stand idly by no longer.
Recent concerns about the First Amendment implications of
certain types of Internet regulation are no longer warranted.
Although the Supreme Court sent a clear message regarding the
constitutionality of obscenity regulations, the case is very differ-
ent for bomb-making instruction manuals. The courts have
you had not committed great sins, God would not have sent a punishment like
me upon you." See id.
139. See Appendix B; See also DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 29.
140. Id. at 29-30.
141. Id. at 30.
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established the blueprint for successfully prosecuting publishers
of these Internet mayhem manuals. The Rice v. Paladin decision
provides prosecutors with a playbook for deterring the propaga-
tion of bomb-making instruction sites while avoiding nonsuits
due to First Amendment protection. Congress should enact the
modified Feinstein Amendment and encourage federal prosecu-
tors to seek out those who enable these and future massacres.
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APPENDIX A
"The Feinstein Amendment"
141 Cong. Rec. S7682 (daily ed. June 5, 1995)
S. 735
It shall be unlawful for any person to teach or demonstrate the
making of explosive materials, or to distribute by any means
information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture
of explosive materials, if the person intends or knows, that such
explosive materials or information will likely be used for, or in
furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal criminal
offense or a criminal purpose affecting interstate commerce.
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APPENDIX B
"DOJ Proposed Modification to Feinstein Amendment"
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/bomb
makinginfo.html#VIC at Section V (c) (last visited November 26,
2001)
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(a) to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explo-
sive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to
distribute by any means information pertaining to, in whole or in
part, the manufacture or use of such an explosive, device or
weapon, intending that such teaching, demonstration or infor-
mation be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that consti-
tutes a Federal criminal offense or a State or local criminal
offense affecting interstate commerce, or
(b) to teach or demonstrate to any particular person the
making or use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon
of mass destruction, or to distribute to any particular person, by
any means, information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the
manufacture or use of such an explosive, device or weapon,
knowing that such particular person intends to use such teach-
ing, demonstration or information for, or in furtherance of, an
activity that constitutes a Federal criminal offense or State or
local criminal offense affecting interstate commerce.
For purposes of this section, the term "explosive" has the
meaning set out in 18 U.S.C. § 844(j). The term "destructive
device" has the meaning set out in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4). The
term "weapon of mass destruction" has the meaning set out in 18
U.S.C.A. § 2332a(c) (2).
Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, C. S.C.

